Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack On Europe Unlikely Soon, Analysts Say

Recent events and statements related to the Iran war, which continues to impact countries beyond Iranian shores, have led to speculation over the possibility that Iran could target Europe with ballistic missiles for the first time. However, analysts are skeptical that Tehran would or even could do so.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently warned European countries that they could “face consequences” if they allowed the United States to use bases on their territory to attack the Islamic Republic. On July 30, he expressed Tehran’s opposition to Bulgaria’s decision to temporarily allow the United States to deploy KC-135 tanker aircraft and personnel at the country’s Bezmer airbase. Sofia has clarified that the deployment does not include offensive weapons. Tanker aircraft like the KC-135 play a vital logistical role in support of U.S. air operations. Araghchi similarly warned Cyprus, which hosts two sovereign British bases, against allowing its territory to be used against Iran.

On July 25, journalist Patrick Cockburn wrote a piece in which he argued that an Iranian missile attack against the United Kingdom isn’t a far-fetched possibility. “Geographical distance from the battlefield is no longer the defense it once was,” he wrote. “Vladimir Putin curtailed a military march-past in Red Square because of fear of drones and soon we may be doing the same in Trafalgar Square and the Mall. International airports and huge power stations provide vulnerable and immovable targets, be they in Dubai or Heathrow.”

Cockburn was writing after Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it considered British bases used by the United States, including RAF Fairfield on the British mainland, “legitimate targets.”

In a first, Ukrainian drones targeted an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea in late July. Iran said the attack hit a commercial vessel, killing one civilian crew member and injuring another. Tehran threatened retaliation. Ukraine claimed that it targeted a Russian warship and other ships used for transporting military supplies from Iran to Russia across the Caspian.

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According to The New York Times, Iran briefly considered targeting a Ukrainian port in retaliation, most likely using a ballistic missile with a small warhead “to make a symbolic point but cause relatively little damage.”

On March 20, Iran fired two Khorramshahr-4 missiles at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, home to a strategic British base used by the United States to support Middle East operations. Neither reached their target. Cockburn noted in his piece that the island is 2,350 miles from Tehran, while London is only a slightly more distant 2,750 miles away.

James Devine, associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Mount Allison University, noted that any attempt by Iran to target Europe with ballistic missiles would mark a major escalation.

“I can only see it if the EU actually joined the U.S. in forcing Iran out of the Gulf and/or mounting a ground invasion,” Devine told me in an interview. “I think there are a lot more steps up the escalatory ladder before we get there.”

Regarding any potential Iranian missile attack targeting war-torn Ukraine, Iran in theory has multiple missiles capable of reaching Ukraine.

“A single missile would not normally have much chance of evading modern missile defense systems, but given Ukraine’s defenses are focused on the threat posed by Russian attacks, it might sneak through,” Devine said.

While Ukraine has developed several systems capable of intercepting Russia’s repeated launches of Iranian-designed Shahed drones, it’s almost always in critically short supply of Patriot interceptors for countering ballistic missiles. For example, a Russian attack on Kyiv Saturday killed nine people after Ukraine was only able to intercept one of the 27 incoming ballistic missiles due to its chronic shortage of Patriot interceptors.

“If Ukraine were to persist in striking Iranian shipping in the Caspian, Tehran may eventually decide a warning strike of this type was necessary to restore deterrence,” Devine said. “However, the Ukrainian government reportedly claimed it was unintentional, suggesting the incident was not likely to be repeated.”

Compared to Ukraine, Iran’s hypothetical options for striking U.S. military assets in Bulgaria are even more limited. Devine noted that the Diego Garcia strike was more “symbolic than strategic” since of the two missiles Tehran launched, one failed while the other was shot down. They most likely had lighter warheads to enable them to travel greater distances, echoing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s attempts to “goad” Israel’s into entering the 1991 Persian Gulf War by launching modified Scuds, the lighter longer-range Al-Husayn, at Israeli cities.

“Attacks of this type would have little or no military impact on the target state, whether it's Bulgaria or London, and put Tehran in a very dangerous position,” Devine said. “By launching a missile strike against a NATO member, Iran would trigger Article 5, which stipulates an attack against one is an attack against all.”

Such a move has the potential to change NATO’s current calculations regarding war in the Persian Gulf, possibly making the alliance much more likely to become directly involved against Tehran.

“Launching a ballistic missile at London in particular would likely be a tipping point,” Devine said.

“Given the risk, and the limited gains to be made by such an attack, it is more likely that Iran would choose another form of punishment for European states that earn its wrath,” he added.

Other forms of “punishment” could include increased cyberattacks or attacking the assets of European countries on foreign soil, such as in the Middle East, through acts of terrorism.

“It is good for Iran if European states are deterred from joining the US in the war, but it has to make sure that its deterrent signaling does not produce the opposite result,” Devine said.

“Therefore, I think we will have to go quite a few more steps up the escalatory ladder before a missile strike against a European state makes sense for Tehran.”

Arash Azizi, a lecturer at Yale University and author of ‘The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions’ as well as an upcoming book on the history of Iran-Israel relations, concurred with this assessment.

“Even if Iran were to be operationally capable of hitting the UK, and that’s a very big if, it’s very unlikely for it to resort to such actions that would trigger NATO’s Article 5 and bring about a much wider consensus against Iran,” Azizi told me in an interview.

Iran already targeted NATO member Turkey with intermittent ballistic missile attacks throughout the initial February 28 to April 8 phase of the Iran war. Ankara presently lacks air defenses with sufficient anti-ballistic capabilities. Luckily for Turkey, U.S. warships in the Eastern Mediterranean shot down these missiles with SM-3 interceptors. Ankara ultimately did not exercise its option of invoking Article 5. And additional NATO air defenses have been deployed to Turkey in recent months.

“The missiles were intercepted; it was an isolated incident as part of a broader lashing out of Iran at many of its neighbors, and it was quickly able to convince Turkey, via private channels, that it regrets it,” Azizi said.

Aside from the political ramifications of targeting Europe, Devine also pointed out that Iran would find it difficult to target a city as distant as London due to the “geography involved.”

“Iranian-based missiles would have to navigate multiple layers of missile defense before reaching a target in western Europe,” he said. “It is a very different situation from the current conflict, where Iran has had its most success launching mass attacks with short-range munitions.”

Several European countries are already upgrading their air defenses to shield themselves against the threat of Russian missiles. And several of them are buying battle-tested systems from Israel. Most notably, Germany has started taking delivery of the Arrow 3 systems it ordered in a landmark 2023 deal. The sophisticated exoatmospheric anti-ballistic missile is designed to destroy long-range ballistic missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere.

In the first year of the Ukraine war in 2022, Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 drones bought from Turkey played a role in staving off Russia’s ill-fated initial assault. By the end of the year, Shahed-136 explosive drones Russia acquired from Iran began targeting Ukraine’s cities and electricity grid. In other words, two Middle Eastern powers were arming both sides of a European war.

In a hypothetical Iranian missile attack targeting London or elsewhere in Europe, it’s conceivable that a German Arrow 3 or another imported Israeli-made system will intercept it.

Russia might even object to its Iranian ally targeting Europe.

“NATO and the US have often used the threat of Iranian missiles as a justification for missile defense systems in Eastern Europe,” Devine said. "If Iran were actually to launch such a strike, it would be easier to argue that anti-missile systems in Poland and other countries are necessary.”

“Putin's rationale for the war in Ukraine would be seriously undermined.”

Iran struggled to acquire Soviet-made Scud missiles from countries like Libya, Syria, and North Korea during its bloody, depleting, and lengthy war with Iraq that raged throughout the 1980s. After the war in the 1990s until the early 2000s, Iran intermittently used ballistic missiles to strike deep inside Iraq, specifically targeting bases belonging to the Iranian opposition group People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, known by its MEK acronym, hosted by Saddam Hussein.

The MEK fully relocated from Iraq by 2016 to the southeastern European country of Albania in the Balkans. In recent years, Iran targeted Albania with cyberattacks. However, upping the ante from cyber to kinetic attacks, such as a ballistic missile strike, even a “symbolic” one, would mark an escalation in order of magnitude different.

For these reasons, Azizi finds that prospect highly unlikely.

“It would alarm the Balkans region and show Iran to be even more out of bounds with the norms than it already is,” he said. “Iran trades in more indirect ways, such as the cyberattacks that led to the cutting of diplomatic ties in 2022.”

“If Iran were to attack European soil, Ukraine would be the most likely option since there has already been an armed interaction between the two countries.”